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Introduction 
Whenever a political party seeks to achieve a significant political control and power in a 
country with democratic rules, it has to achieve three partly overlapping goals: acquire a 
majority of the votes during parliamentary elections, be able to transfer those votes into 
parliamentary seats and transform those into a government (Ziegfeld & Tudor 2013: 2). 
With enough seats, but members of parliament hesitant to be part of the government, 
several predominant parties have lost their dominant positions (Nyblade 2004: 11-13). 
However, the most important starting point for a party seeking or securing its continued 
hegemony is the goal of securing enough votes on national elections.  
This thesis aims to contribute to the study field of pluralistic dominance—predominant 
party systems and its inner dynamics by looking at electoral strategies predominant 
parties take in order to maintain their position of power. This aspect is analysed using 
one of the newer cases of predominance—the African National Congress (hereafter the 
“ANC”) in South Africa since 1994.  
When studying the workings of predominant party systems, most authors have focused 
on classifying such an anomaly, its supposed (negative) effects on pluralism and 
democracy or diminished opportunities for split and insignificant opposition parties in 
them. According to author’s knowledge, a few observations have been made about the 
ideological direction of predominant parties, with most of them focusing on conditions 
creating (pre-)dominance, not the strategies and dynamics of predominant parties 
themselves. Despite that, a theory of maintaining flexibility by (authoritarian leaning) 
dominant parties has been developed by David White, which can also be applied to the 
study of predominant party systems.  
Also, while some attempts to describe few aspects of new predominant parties in 
Southern Africa have been made, systematic research about that part of the world is 
scarce. At the same time the examples of new predominant systems in Namibia, 
Botswana and South Africa add important dynamics to the old concept. In contrast 
many African parties lack several important characteristics and functions of an average 
party in Europe, aggravating the scarcity of research (Erdmann 2004: 64-65). This thesis 
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contributes to this research field, by building on the work of Elischner (2011) and 
Bogaards (2004) and looks into the dynamics of the party system in South Africa.   
By concentrating on the theory of maintaining flexibility of dominant parties by David 
White, this thesis tests the hypothesis that the African National Congress as a 
predominant party will adopt a catch-all strategy to catch the maximum amount of votes 
in elections and this means positioning itself in the center of the left-right ideological 
continuum. To prove this hypothesis African National Congress’ ideology will be 
studied by applying the content analysis method developed by the Manifesto Research 
Group/ Comparative Manifestos project (hereafter the “MRP”) on ANC’s four election 
manifestos from 1994 to 2009. The 1994 parliamentary elections were the first elections 
for the former liberation movement, 2014 will not be part of the analysis, as these 
elections took place too recently (on May 6th 2014). The results gained by appling the 
MRG method will be analysed and a modified ideological left-right scale will be 
created, allowing to make conclusions about the positioning of the ANC and also its 
ideology according to election manifestos. 
This thesis is divided into three parts. The first chapter will focus on building the 
theoretical framework by establishing the connection between ideology and electoral 
strategies, the definition and understanding of predominance and analysing existing 
theories on electoral strategies and party (pre-) dominance. Lastly, a look at the African 
research context will be given. The second chapter focuses on building the research 
model and interpreting the hypothesis into measurable research questions. This chapter 
is extensive, as the interpretation of primary data by the author needs a proper set-up. In 
addition to that, research concepts from several fields will be used to set up the 
hypothesis in a measurable way. The third chapter focuses on empirical analysis, testing 
the hypothesis in two different ways—by looking at the ideological positioning of ANC 
on the left-right scale, its ideology and the coverage of the most important issues for 
South African voters. The full results of the MRP coding can be found in the Appendix 
2. 
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Theoretical framework 
In this part relevant theories concerning predominant party systems, the framework of 
electoral strategies and an analytical overview of the exisiting research on ideological 
positioning and African political systems will be explored to study electoral behaviour 
of predominant party systems.  
Definining and understanding (pre)dominance 
The most used and analytically useful way to categorise dominance has been offered by 
Giovanni Sartori (1976: 192-201), who writes: “Whenever we find a polity, a party that 
outdistances all the others, this party is dominant in that it is signifantly stronger than 
the others” (p. 193). Sartori notes the difference between a party having slight or some 
dominance (like the Christian Democrats of Italy, Sartori 1976: 195) and a predominant 
party system, where party displays significant majority in elections leaving other parties 
far behind. Sartori explains the difference as follows: a moderately dominant party may 
still qualify as a two-party system or polarised multiparty system, displaying different 
inner dynamics, but a dominant party system means significant electoral advantage and 
power (Sartori 1976: 195-200). In the same way Sartori notes the methodical confusion 
of using the word “dominant” and differentiates between authoritarian, non-democratic 
one party vs. hegemonic party system (depending on whether the authoritarian party 
allows the de iure existence of opposition parties), and predominant party system, with 
“predominance” standing for softer, democratic meaning (Sartori 1976: 195). For still 
developing, fluid political systems Sartori suggests the use of “dominant party system”, 
noting the danger of applying all the conclusions of consolidated countries in the 
context of developing nations (Sartori 1976: 260).   
This thesis focuses on analysing predominant, not hegemonic, parties, however excerpts 
from the study of dominant parties are used due to lack or researchin this field. In such 
instances, critical view must and will be taken whether the same conclusions are 
relevant in the context of pluralist democracies.  
According to Sartori, predominant party system is a pluralist political system, where one 
party outdistances all the other parties by winning the absolute majority of seats in the 
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legislature for at least three consecutive elections. The system stops being predominant 
as soon as predominance is lost, most often becoming a polarised multiparty system. 
Sartori identifies the empirical cases of the Indian National Congress, the Liberal 
Democratic Party in Japan, the Colorado Party in Uruguay, the Norwegian Labour Party 
the Swedish Social Democratic Party (Sartori 1976: 200) and other predominant 
systems in Turkey and Ireland. In author’s opinion, more recent cases of Namibia, 
Botswana and South Africa also qualify. While dominant parties are quite common in 
Africa (see Bogaards 2004), these three qualify in terms of Sartori’s definition of 
electoral dominance, but also stand out as more or less consolidated democracies. Some 
authors have used the examples of Institutional Revolutionary Party in Mexico and 
Kuomintang in Taiwan, but due to their authoritarian practices (Gandhi & Lust-Okar 
2009), they do not qualify as predominant, but rather as hegemonic party systems.  
Other authors have used similar definitions, with some changes in the extent of 
dominance (from simple majority to 70% of the seats), duration (the results of one 
election vs. 20 years), recognition of dominance by the society or the dynamics of 
opposition parties (divided or not relevant) (see Bogaards 2004: 176 for a 
comprehensive comparison of different definitions).  
In addition to definitions needed for classification, several authors have focused on 
relevant empirical cases to see what sets predominant parties apart. After a closer look 
at the empirical cases in industrialising countries, Giliomee’s and Simkins (1999), 
contributing to the works of Pempel (1990) define the predominant party (as a unit) as 
the one which enjoys electoral dominance over a long period of time, has the control 
over forming governments and has the power to shape public opinion and pursue its 
historical mission (Pempel 1990: 6-7; Giliomee & Simkins 1999: 37). While these are 
interesting criteria, they are outside the analysis framework of this thesis. Future 
research could be conducted to study the validity of such definitions using the MRP 
method to map the advocation of historical mission by the predominant party.  
As Bogaards has concluded, Sartori’s definition still holds the most ground (Bogaards 
2004) and allows to divide empirical cases in the clearest way possible. Another reason 
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to focus on Sartori’s classification is that it is particularly helpful in the African context 
(Bogaards 2004), on which this thesis also focuses.  
Party competition and electoral strategy  
The most important test for political parties are elections, where voters with limited 
time, knowledge and focus make one political decision that will decide the fate of 
complex public policies (Dalton, Farrell & McAllister 2011: 82-83). It is mostly 
assumed, that parties seek to secure the maximum amount of votes during elections and 
do so by taking account two main factors: 1) the beliefs of their core members and their 
core ideological views (Vassallo & Wilcox 2006: 413-414) and 2) (ideological) 
preferences of voters (Downs 1957; Dalton, Farrell & McAllister 2011: 82-83).  
While voters are of course affected by issues other than ideological preferences, 
ideology still plays a prominent role in the decision-making of voters and it is 
something parties actively use to shape the public policy space (Budge 2006: 422-426).  
There is an interaction between these two factors—parties, especially popular ones have 
the power to influence the political agenda and what issues their voters find important 
and at the same time voters’ preferences define which parts of ideologies parties stress. 
Very often a party has to find a balance between those two—there is no point in talking 
about issues no longer relevant to their voters, at the same time parties cannot 
completely abandon their votes—leapfrog other parties—as they would risk looking 
spineless (Downs 1957).  
In additition to that, no party advocates in isolation. Depending on the context, parties 
form their strategies also in comparison to the position and politics of other parties—
contrasting the negative qualities of their political opponents, stressing their strengths 
and summarising this in their speeches, articles and election manifestos (Budge 2006: 
422-423).  
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Predominance and ideological positioning 
Maintaining dominace through flexibility: David White 
The most compelling and thorough analysis of the impact of dominant parties and their 
ideological positioning has been offered by David White (2011). While he applies his 
theoretical framework on a number of cases either short on electoral support to qualify 
as predominant party systems (Christian Democrats in Italy) or parties, which display 
signs of hegemonic parties (United Russia in Russia, Institional Revolutionary Party in 
Mexico), his framework is still valid for analysing predominant party systems. As 
predominant party systems operate in democratic pluralism and their hands are tied 
from monopolising political power, they have to rely even more on securing the 
majority of votes. This allows the author to assume that this theory is also valid in 
pluralist settings. However, due to this, only those aspects of White’s theory applicable 
to democratic countries will be described and analysed. For example he also talks about 
the monopolisation of state’s power and resources, which is something democratic 
parties might want to undertake, but face limited options for achieving it.  
White uses the examples of Mexico, Japan, Italy and Russia and builds on the work of 
Duverger (1954) and Arnes and Barnes (1974). He points out strategies of dominant 
parties in establishing their power and elaborates the dynamics of maintaining dominant 
party’s political power.  
White claims that in order to secure its rule, the dominant party has to be both rigid and 
flexible at the same time. He describes the rise of the dominant party very similarly to 
what has been defined as the model of a mass party (Krouwel 2006: 254-255): “In the 
period of mobilization the dominant party builds a cohesive support base and develops a 
committed body of activists around a set of common goals.” (White 2011: 660).  
He goes on to point out that having achieved dominance, the party faces tension—on 
the one hand it needs to maintain its core support, but at the same not only keep the door 
open for new voters, but to actively attract them to maintain dominance and maintain 
the position of a party representing the whole nation. This means that the party has to 
adapt its strategy and appeal to the widest voter group possible. This leads to adopting a 
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catch-all, non-ideological, centrist position and hijacking the most popular opposition 
policies (White 2011: 660). White goes on to describe the need for mobilisation of 
important voter groups, which means concentrating on key socio-economic groups and 
promising them the minimum programme guaranteeing maximum pay-off.  
This goes hand in hand with his use of the term “catch-all party”, developed by Otto 
Kirchheimer (1966, via Krouwel 2006: 256). According to Kirchheimer catch-all parties 
are characterised by the decline of ideology and thus they become the vehicles of 
material claims and interests for the increasing middle class and other bigger groups in 
the society (Krouwel 2006: 256-258). With decreased ideological sentiments in the 
society, parties are left with making promises about who gets what according to their 
size.  
White’s analysis is mostly coherent with the main conclusions of the basics of theories 
on electoral strategy, apart from one aspect.  As noted earlier, even predominant parties 
cannoy fully and dramatically abandon their former views, as voters would interpret this 
as being spineless. This means that the “flexibility” discussed is quite limited. This is 
also coherent with empirical findings of predominant parties losing their dominance by 
going ideologically too far (to the left) (Nyblade 2004: 19-20). However, as most parties 
appealing to masses have to stay away from ideological extremes, they can still move 
towards the centre.  
Other approaches 
Other existing research directions known to the author on the issue of electoral 
dominance and ideological positioning have focused on observing the advantage of the 
centrist position of a large party in coalition formation.  
When talking about about ruling parties in polarised multi-party systems (the closest 
system to predominant parties), Sartori notes that large centrally positioned parties with 
ideologically distant opposition parties often enjoy dominance in coalition building 
(Sartori 1976: 134-137) and in general. Basing his analysis on the case of Indian 
National Congress, Riker (1976; via Cox 1997: 236) suggests that the centrist positition 
of the party helps to assure its dominance, as long as the opposition remains divided far 
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along the both sides of the ideological continuum. The same analysis, but from the 
aspect of coordination of coalition governments is offered by Cox (1997: 238-247).  
All of these approaches suggest that the centrist position provides advantages for a large 
party operating with divided opposition, but gives little explanation why parties formed 
such an ideological position in the first place or what keeps them there. Thus White’s 
theory complements such empirical findings with its causal framework and raises the 
importance of validating his theory, especsially in the context of predominant party 
systems’ behaviour. 
Predominant party systems research and Africa 
Traditionally, several important challenges complicate the study of parties and party 
systems in non-industrialised countries, which include most African countries.  
A systematic overview has been given by Erdmann (2004), mapping differences 
between African and European political systems and parties. He points out the 
following challenges relevant for the study of party systems: weak formal structures and 
strong informal and personalised relations, barely distinguishable programmes, which in 
most cases bear no relation to their policies, predominantly regional and/or ethnic-based 
membership and electorate; clientist relations with party supporters (Erdman 2004: 65). 
Similar problems have been noted by other authors-- low levels of institutionalisation, 
lack of ideological differences (Van der Walle 2003) and ever present ethnic cleavages 
and politics based upon it (Horowitz 1985: 301) prevent the usage of conventional 
methods to study party politics. 
When specifically discussing dominance and predominance, Matthijs Bogaards (2004) 
has developed a systematic overview about which methodical concepts of party systems 
are useful in the African context, pointing out the advantages of Sartori’s framework (p 
178), especially in the context, where lack of democracy and rise of authoritarianism are 
common.  
In author’s opinion majority of these issues are not applicable on South Africa, 
especially regards to the use of the MRP research method. Firstly, South Africa is 
13 
among the wealthiest of African nations and with a highly institutionalised party system 
(Randall 2006: 388). Secondly, recent work by Sebastian Elischner (2011) demonstrates 
the usability and utility of the MRP/CMP method in the African context and uses it to 
map the policy space of Namibia, a country with very similar circumstances to South 
Africa. Thirdly, even if the method is less useful than in the European context, it 
provides a systematic framework for analysis discouraging the subjectivity of 
interpreting election manifestos in other ways. Also, the results can be easily proven and 
disproven and compared with other relevant cases (such as the analysis of African 
parties by Elischner, 2011). 
Model of research  
This chapter focuses on setting up a proper empirical framework to study the proposed 
hypothesis and provide an example for future research. Firstly, an overview of the MRP 
research method and its theoretical assumptions will be given, allowing the detailed 
study of ANC’s ideological positioning. 
After that, the model for measurement of the catch-all strategy and placement in the 
center of the political spectrum will be devised in two ways. The first features creating a 
model for measuring centrism on the MRP ideological left-right continuum. The second 
focuses on establishing the key promises relevant for the South African electorate and 
analysing how to map them using the MRP coding scheme.  
The question on ANC’s predominance will also be answered as part of empirical 
analysis, but no separate research model is needed beyond Sartori’s definition in the 
first chapter.  
Manifesto Research Project/ Comparative Research Group’s method 
The MRP research method is a quantitative content analysis method applied to party 
manifestos, conducted manually by researchers, allowing them to map and compare 
policy preferences of political parties in space and time, both ideological and non-
ideological preferences. Party manifestos are used, as they are the most prominent 
documents in election campaigns (Budge 2011: 5-6). Also, most party manifestos are 
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public and published prior to each election, allowing comparison in time (Volkens 
2002: 2). 
In addititon to the MRP/CMP research method, other ways to analyse policy 
preferences include expert surveys and opinion poll data. However, these methods have 
proven to allow less unified and less specific comparisons—expert surveys do not 
change in time and voter preferences identify opinions of voters, not real life 
preferences political parties hold (Budge 2001: 6-7). Although several alternatives have 
been devised, the MRP/CMP method is still seen among the most reliable ways of 
mapping policy preferences and the authors have responded to almost all the criticisms 
presented (see Klingemann et. al. 2006).  
The MRP method is based on the salience theory. One of the pioneers of the MRP 
method, David Robertson discovered that while parties compete with each other and 
party positions might change in time, parties argue with each other by emphasising 
different salient policy priorities they are competent in, rather than by directly 
confronting each other on same issues (Budge et al 2001: 7). He also concluded that 
parties talk about both ideological and non-ideological issues, depending on which 
issues strike out as most valiant for voters (Budge 2006: 424). An example of this 
would be party positions on welfare issues. Although most voters benefit from some 
form of state welfare services, many voters also oppose tax increases guaranteeing those 
services. It is less useful for a party seeking to maximise its votes to directly oppose a 
rival advocating for severe tax cuts. Instead a more likely strategy would be to stress the 
need for public services, emphasising the salience of desired issues (Elischner 2011: 
645).  
The MRG/CMP method takes manifestos and divides them into coding units with one 
unit corresponding to a quasi-sentence. All the quasi-sentences get coded between 56 
universal categories (see Appendix 1 for the full list of categories), which carry 
information about the content of the manifesto and create comparative data independent 
of the specific socio-economic or cultural settings (Volkens 2002) of a country. 
Uncodable units get coded as “000” and are counted separately. 56 categories are 
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divided into 7 domains allowing more specific content analysis, allowing to identify the 
most important issues for a party in question.  
Referring back to ideology: the left-right scale 
While any data can hardly catch the richness of political ideologies, a spatial continuum 
of left and right ideologies is  often used to map voters’s and parties’ policy preferences 
allowing to see the universal ideological disagreement between parties about the scope 
of government intervention in society (Budge 2001: 19; Budge 2006: 422).  As White’s 
theory also presumes such a continuum, this approach of ideological positioning has 
been chosen.   
The MRP method also allows to map left and right statements and deduce an ideological 
positioning based on it. Out 56 categories, 26 make up the programmatic categories 
with 13 defined as left and 13 as right wing (see Table 1). In order to calculate party’s 
left-right positions, one must add up percentage references to the categories grouped as 
left and right respectively and subtract the sum of the left percentages from the sum of 
right percentages (McDonald & Budge 2005: 36). The scale is 200-point scale from -
100 to +100, the minus standing for the left side. With a position of -100 a party would 
be making only left statements and +100 with a manifesto focusing exclusively on right 
statements.   
Table 1. Creation of a left‐right scale from coding of manifesto sentences 
(McDonald & Budge 2005: 37).  
Right Left 
Military: positive Decolonisation 
Freedom, human rights Military: negative 
Constitutionalism: positive Peace 
Effective authority Internationalism: positive 
Free enterprise Democracy 
Economic incentives Regulate capitalism 
Protectionism: negative Economic planning 
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Economic orthodoxy Protectionism: positive 
Social services limitation Controlled economy 
National way of life: positive Nationalisation 
Traditional morality: positive Social services: expansion 
Law and order Education: expansion 
Social harmony Labour groups: positive 
 
It must be noted, that the MRP scale itself does not enable relating policy preferences 
back to ideologies and placement on the the extremes does not automatically qualify 
party as the most extreme. However, it is still highly probable that if a party manifesto 
has no mentions of either the left or the right side, it has a very strong ideology.  
Measuring the catch-all strategy and centrism 
In order to prove the hypothesis that predominant parties take a catch-all strategy to 
maintain their dominance, a measurable meaning needs to be given to the idea of a 
catch-all strategy and centrist position as an electoral strategy. The catch-all strategy is a 
concept from the theory of party models (Krouwel 2006: 256), where parties have 
reduced their ideological baggage and accepted the welfare state and economic planning 
by the state from the right side and from the left side abandoned the ideas for revisions 
of capitalism (Krouwel 2006: 257). Instead, it places itself to moderate position, 
working on repelling as few voters as possible. This is very similar to White’s analysis 
about bringing in key voter groups from all over the society and making process to key 
voter groups in order to keep their support.   
In author’s opinion there are two ways to prove the hypothesis of ANC adopting a 
catch-all strategy: 1) measure the ideological positioning of ANC and see if it is centrist; 
2) identify key promises made to big key voter groups allowing material gains and see if 
these are also prominent in ANC’s manifestos.  
Measuring centrism  
To locate centrism on the MRP left-right continuum, the author has created a combined 
scale (see Figure 1), based on the classification of the Comparative Study of Electroal 
17 
System’s (hereafter CSES; Dalton, Farrell & McAllister 2011: 86) 10-point left-right 
scale and transferred it to the MRP 200- point scale. While the MRP and CSES scale are 
different in their methods, they imply the same numerical positioning of the Left and 
Right and such a mind model is helpful for less complicated analysis. Also, systematic 
empirical comparison of these scales conducted by Dalton, Farrell & McAllister has 
demonstrated unified applicability of both scales (2011: 117-118).  
This thesis uses the categorisation of centrism by Oddbjern Knutsen, who places 
centrism between 4-6 points on the CSES scale (Knutsen 1998: 292), corresponding to -
20 and +20 on the MRP scale.  This has been reviewed by the author by looking at the 
classification of empirical cases of nine party families on the left-right scale (Dalton, 
Farrell & McAllister 2011: 125-126) and evaluating the ideological content of them and 
their compatibility with the catch-all strategy. Such a review reveals the need to widen 
the centrist scale to fit the moderate parts of social democracy and right liberalism. 
Hence the modified scale places centrism between 3,8 and 6,5 corresponding to -24 and 
+30 on the MRP scale. This means that centrism comprises of such ideologies as 
moderate social democracy (WVS placement mean 3.66, MRP mean thus about -28), 
new left/labour (placement mean 3.87/-24) liberalism (placement mean 5.36/+6), 
Christian democracy (placement mean 6.22/+24) and very moderate right liberalism 
(placement mean 6.42/+28) (Dalton, Farrell & McAllister 2011: 125-126). Just in case, 
both the original framework by Knutsen and the revised framework by the author will 
be analysed.  
Figure 1. A combined model of mapping centrism on the MRP ideological 
continuum, author’s and Knutsen’s model.  
 
0 
-100 
+100 
-24 +30 
Widened centrism 
Knutsen’s centrism 
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Measuring key promises 
The catch-all electoral strategy involves giving strategic promises about the most 
important issues to the most important and largest voter groups, often involing material 
gains. While this thesis is too short for a detailed analysis of the South African 
electorate, the most important issues can be easily measured by looking at which issues 
voters themselves identify.  
According to author’s knowledge such mapping about South Africa exists since from 
1999 (Afrobarometer 2014), where voters are asked about the most important issues the 
government should address. Thus a summary of those issues from Afrobarometer 
studies is used from 1999-2009. Even though there is no data about 1994, there 
probably is not such a big leap in people’s opinions and thus 1994 is also included as 
part of the analysis. These issues are: unemployment, crime, housing, corruption, 
poverty, AIDS (Afrobarometer 2012: 7-8). These correspond directly with the following 
MRP/CMP categories: labour groups: positive, law and order: positive, political 
corruption: negative, governmental and administrative efficiency: positive, welfare 
expansion, economic growth and equality (also refers to socio-economic equality and 
fair income distribution) (Volkens 2002). Seeing if these issues are important to ANC 
will help to determine whether ANC has adopted a catch-all strategy to attract large 
voter groups.  
Table 2. Overview of the most important problems SA voters think their 
government should address (Afrobarometer 2012: 7-8).  
Issue Average importance 
1999-2008, % of 
voters 
Corresponding MRP category 
Unemployment 71 Labour groups: positive, Welfare 
expansion 
Crime and security 38,5 Law and order 
Housing 25 Welfare expansion, equality 
Poverty 22 Welfare expansion, equality 
Corruption 14 Political corruption: negative 
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AIDS 16,4 Welfare expansion 
 
A more precise view presented in the Table 2 shows that if ANC is a catch-all party, its 
manifestos should specifically address the categories of welfare expansion, labour 
groups: positive and somewhat the category of law and order. 
Empirical analysis 
This chapter concentrates on analysing the data created by appling the MRP research 
method on election manifestos of the African National Congress. Firstly, an overview of 
national election results in South Africa will be given, allowing to identify ANC’s 
predominance. Secondly, few relevant challenges with the application of the coding will 
be identified. Thirdly and fourthly, the ideological positiong of ANC will be identified 
together with main cateogries mentioned. This is followed by the analysis of the 
strategic issues promised by the catch-all party.   
ANC as a predominant party 
As seen from the Table 2, South Africa is clearly a predominant system according to 
Sartoris classification, exceeding Sartori’s criteria by more than 10% of the votes. In 
years 1999 and 2004 ANC grew its dominance, but recent elections (2009, 2014) have 
lead to a decline in hegemony. It will be interesting to see, whether such a decline 
continues, predicting the end of the predominance. 
Table 3. ANC’s results on national elections 
Year % of votes Seats in the parliament (out of 
400) 
Formed the government 
alone 
1994 62,65 252 No, a coalition with the 
National Party and Inkatha 
Freedom Party, born out of 
political compromise 
1999 66,36 266 Yes 
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2004 69,69 279 Yes 
2009 65,9 264 Yes 
2014 62,2 249 Yes 
Sources: Southall 2000: 12; Electoral Commission 2004; Election Resources 2014.  
Applying the MRP/CMP coding scheme 
There were few issues with the application of the coding scheme worth bringing up. 
Firstly, 2 categories were added to mark specific issues that seemed ungroupable, but 
important enough to be separately grouped.  While coding scheme mentions agricultural 
issues (703, non-programmatic content), a bulk of quasi-sentences focused spefically on 
rural poverty and the development of rural areas. Thus a category 707 “Rural Life and 
Development: positive” was created. Also, bulk of quasi-sentences mentioned very 
general calls for the improvement of “quality of life”, with no specific policy mentioned 
together with it (whenever it contained more specific policy codable with the method, 
that option was used, mostly under categories in domain 5). Thus a separate category 
508 “Quality of life” was created to accommodate this. Both of these codings do not 
affect the L-R scale, as they would have otherwise been coded under non-programmatic 
categories (economic goals, agriculture, and equality). However, they will be part of the 
content analysis, as both of these closely relate to valiant issues for voters, specifically 
the issue of reducing poverty and unemployment.  
As the MRG/CMP coding scheme was created with Europe in mind, two categories 
focusing on European integration are inapplicable to South Africa. But South Africa 
belongs to two main regional inter-governmental organisations: the African Union and 
the Southern African Development Community.  As the SADC involves economic co-
operation in addition to political, categories were renamed to contain SADC integration 
respectively.  
Units coded under 000 affect the scale and any calculations made, as they are added to 
the total sum of statements. Manifestos since 1999 and particularly the 1999 general 
election’s manifesto contained many statements not about forward-looking policy 
preferences of ANC, but statements (also ideological and otherwise codable) focusing 
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on past achievements—what has been achieved (by ANC). These were also coded as 
000 “No meaningful category applies”, as they do not contain active policy preferences. 
ANC and centrism 
Table 4. ANC’s ideological positioning 
 1994 1999 2004 2009 average 
N 236 237 240 347 
Number of Left values: 99 30 58 138 
% L -41.95 -12.66 -24.17 -39.77 
Number of right values: 53 42 38 28 
% R 22.46 17.72 15.83 8.07 
% ideological position -19.49 5.06 -8.33 -31.70 -13,62 
1994 
In 1994 when first entering electoral public space as a former liberation movement, 
ANC’s views had previously been described as strongly left (Peet 2002: 54). According 
to author’s analysis ANC advocated a left leaning programme in 1994 elections, 
qualifying as a typical labour party and also adhering to the hypothesis of a catch-all 
party. As Elischner notes (2011), some categories of the L-R scale have less ideological 
meaning, like democracy and human rights (placed on the opposing sides of the scale). 
These categories help to place anti-system parties, but make it more difficult to place 
mainstream parties, who are more moderate. In 1994, both of these categories are 
prominent (about 10% each), but cancel each other out from the final calculation. Also, 
civic mindedness (call for national unity and social harmony) makes up a large 
proportion of the right emphasis (10%), while economic policies very little.  This is 
coherent with South African politics, as 1994 marked the first free and equal elections 
for all South Africans and issues of overcoming the apartheid legacy were important.  
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1999 
In 1999, ANC’s ideology makes about 25-point move towards the right, classifying its 
policy preferences as liberalism. Left emphasis comprises of the expansion of the 
welfare state, positive mentions of labour groups and democracy, while most of the 
right emphasis is formed by stressing positive civic mindedness and governmental 
efficiency. As some of the past-looking statements coded as 000 contain ideological 
statements, the 1999 placement result is less reliable for analysis. However, ANC’s 
ideological positioning is very close to the center of the scale, clearly qualifying as a 
catch-all party.  
2004 
In 2004, there is about 13-point move towards the left, still close to the center. ANC’s 
policy preferences resemble a typical labour party. Most popular ideological statements 
concern the expansion of the welfare state and positive mentions of labour groups and 
democracy. About 6% mentions of positive internationalism and peace stand out from 
other manifestos. Most of the right emphasis is made up by positive civic mindedness 
(6% decrease), positive law and order, with a first time addition of economic statements, 
like relying on economic orthodoxy or economic incentives.  
2009 
In 2009, there is a strong movement towards the left, further than in 1994. This places 
the party narrowly outside the wider centrism framework and 10 points past the 
Knutsen’s idea of centrism. The left emphasis consists of clearly ideological issues—the 
welfare state expansion (15%), education expansion (8%), and the support for labour 
groups (7%). Democracy makes up about 5% of the whole programme. There are very 
few mentions of Right categories with an emphasis on law and order (3%) and 
governmental efficiency (2%) and civic mindedness’ importance is further decreased. 
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Concluding remarks: ANC and centrism 
Graph 2. ANC’s ideological posititioning 
 
As demonstrated in Table 4 and Graph 2, on average ANC’s policy preferences can be 
qualified as left leaning and clearly centrist according to both scales. However, summa 
summarum does not equal proving the hypothesis, needing closer inspection.  
All in all, empirical analysis proves that on average the African National Congress does 
behave as a predominant party system according to White’s theory by occupying the 
centrist position. The application of the MRP coding has allowed to validate the 
hypothesis that the African National Congress as a predominant party has opted for a 
centrist ideological positition right after achieving predominance and maintained it 
throughout 15 years, until narrowly passing the mark of centrism for left in 2009 and 
according to the more strict classification on centrism by Knutsen, having moved 
clearly further from centrism.  
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ANC’s clear movement to the left in 2009 has also been noted by others (van Wyk 
2009). While this paper did not map the 2014. election manifesto, further research is 
needed to see if 2009 marks a temporary drift or a permanent tendency in ANC’s 
ideological positioning. Interestingly, several predominant parties have lost their 
predominance at the time they moved further to the left (Nybled 2004). The popularity 
of ANC has also been in decline as it moved to the left. This can be explained with two 
conflicting explanations: either the South African voters are repelled by the leftist 
rhethorics and vote accordingly or other reasons are responsible for ANC’s rising 
unpopularity. To compensate for those issues, a predominant party would have the 
incentive to promise more material gains like expanding welfare, education etc and thus 
move to the left on the MRP scale (as these issues qualify as leftist categories). For 
example, the end of the predominance of the Japanise Liberal Democratic Party in 1989 
was partly due to corruption issues and voters failed to support the planned tax rise 
(Nyblade 2004: 19), the Swedish Social Democratic Party lost their predominance in 
1976 by moving too far to the left (Nyblade 2004: 20). The full explanation to the 2009. 
shift can be given with analysing 2014. and subsequent election manifestos and ANC’s 
dominance.  
ANC’s promises as a catch-all party  
Table 5. Important categories for RSA voters put on the MRP coding scheme. 
Listed in descending order.  
Name of Category L-R 1994% 1999% 2004% 2009% 
504 Welfare State 
Expansion 
L 15.3 3.4 7.5 15.3 
503 Equality: Positive   8.1 6.3 6.7 6.1 
701 Labour Groups: 
Positive 
L 3.8 4.2 5 8.4 
605 Law and Order: 
Positive 
R 2.1 1.7 4.6 3.5 
303 Governmental and 
Administrative Efficiency: 
Positive 
R 1.7 3 2.1 2.3 
304 Political Corruption: 
Negative   
0.8 0.8 1.7 0.3 
410 Economic Growth   1.7 0.4 1.7 5.5 
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508 Quality of Life   0.4 2.5 0.8 0.6 
707 Rural Life and 
Development: Positive 
  
1.7 0.4 2.1 4.0 
Altogether   35.6 22.8 32.1 45.8 
 
As shown in the previous chapter, according to the Afrobarometer (2012: 7-9) RSA 
voters find the issues unemployment, crime and security, housing, poverty, corruption 
and AIDS as most important needing action from the government (the ANC). Table 5 
presents these issues as part of the MRP coding scheme in the order of importance 
allocated by ANC in their manifesto. According to the theory, these categories should 
be among the most salient ones, as ANC as a catch-all party needs to address the most 
important issues relevant to large voter groups. 
As shown on Table 5, some issues get less attention, but this is expected. The quality of 
life and rural life categories, added by the author to MRP-s coding scheme, correspond 
to quite specific statements and it is expected that not that much time should be spent on 
them. Welfare expansion—a category containing several issues flagged by the public 
opinion is the most popular category in the whole manifesto (with the exception of the 
000, not applicable category) and labour groups and equality closely behind it. The 
proportion of the law and order category is surprisingly small, considering South 
Africa’s high crime rates and the fact that voters flagged this issue as the second one 
just behind unemployment (see Table 2). Governmental efficiency and removing 
political corruption are mentioned less than expected. This can be explained with the 
ANC wanting to avoid these issues, as predominant parties often face corruption and 
ineffiency charges, as the line between the state and the party begins to blur. For 
example in 2009, opposition parties used the anti-corruption label to differentiate 
themselves from ANC (Lemon 2009: 672).  
Conclusively, this part of the empirical analysis demonstrates that the African National 
Congress definitely captures major issues South African voters worry about, spending a 
majority of its programme on such issues. The avoidance of corruption is logical, as a 
predominant party often faces such charges. All of this confirms the hypothesis that the 
African National Congress campaigns as a catch-all party. 
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Summary 
This thesis focused on the predominant party system and its inner dynamics by looking 
at electoral strategies a predominant party is forced to take to maintain its electoral 
dominance. By using David White’s theory about the flexibility of dominant parties, a 
hypothesis was created, claiming that in order not to succumb electoral competition, 
predominant party opts for a catch-all electoral strategy, occupying the ideological 
center. Based on the concept of a catch-all party, it was elaborated that predominant 
party’s campaign promises often focus on dividing economic welfare and promising 
material gain to the most important voter groups to yet again ensure its dominance.  
To study this hypothesis, Sartori’s classification and analysis on predominant parties 
was used to differentiate between democratic and non-democratic dominance. After 
reviewing and complementing David White’s theory, a research model was created to 
prove the hypothesis.The research model consisted of applying the content analysis 
method developed by the Manifesto Research Group/ Comparative Manifestos project 
(hereafter the “MRP”) on ANC’s four election manifestos from 1994 to 2009. The 
results gained by appling the MRG method were analysed and a numerical scale based 
on CSES and MRP left-right ideological continuum was created, taking into account 
existing empirical divisions of political parties on this scale. This scale allowed to 
qualify parties as centrist between the values of -24 up to +30 on the MRP left-right 
scale and can also be used to conduct future research about predominance and 
ideological positioning in the centre.  
After determining that the African National Congress easily qualifies as a predominant 
party, empirical analysis was conducted, allowing the validation of the hypothesis that 
the African National Congress as a predominant party indeed occupies the ideological 
center. This was confirmed by looking at party manifestos from 1994 to 2004. However, 
it turned out that in 2009 ANC’s ideology took a strong direction towards the left side 
of the scale, moving away from the center. In author’s opinion, this indicates a typical 
desperation of a predominant party losing its dominance and thus responding with a 
strong campaign promising material gains, which qualify the manifesto as leftist. The 
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content of ANC’s 2009 manifesto shows a lot of emphasis put on promising increased 
welfare and job creation, confirming this explanation.  
The developed scale also allowed to track the general ideological positioning of the 
African National Congress. While ANC has been classified as a social democratic party 
by voters and as a former leftist, but currently neoliberal party by some authors, the 
MRP coding demonstrated that the African National Congress’ policy preferences 
indicate its ideology is rather centrist and fluid, ranging from New Labour to liberalism 
and in 2009 moving back to social democracy. This is the first time a systematic 
analysis of ANC’s ideology has been conducted.  
The second part of the empirical analysis demonstrated that the African National 
Congress also acts like a catch-all party by emphasising issues that have also been 
identified as very important by the majority of South Africans. A catch-all strategy 
involves identifying salient issues for big and important voter groups and stressing on 
those, rather than following a very strong socio-economic cleavage or one specific 
socio-economic group. Using Afrobarometer’s data, it was concluded that ANC 
conforms to such behaviour by stressing the need for welfare expansion, job creation 
and guaranteeing law and order more than other categories in its manifestos. These 
issues are also important for RSA voters. Thus this thesis found confirmation for both 
hypotheses.  
This thesis suggests several further research directions. Firstly, the application of the 
MRP research method by the author and formerly by Elischner demonstrates the 
usability of it on more developed and instituationalised African countries, allowing 
more systematic research of African parties and their policy preferences. Secondly, in 
author’s opinion, Botswana, Namibia and South Africa allow a fascinating look into the 
workings of a predominant party, also displaying unique characteristics common only to 
African countries. Predominant parties are rare, but interesting cases of an awkward 
embrace by democratic rules and autocratic norms and still lack an analytical 
framework to map its inner dynamics.   
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Kokkuvõte 
Predominantsuse mõju erakonna valimisstrateegiale Aafrika Rahvusliku Kongressi 
näitel 
Anna Karolin 
Käesolev bakalaureusetöö uuris, missugune on predominantsuse mõju erakonna 
valimisstrateegiale. Predominantsed erakonnad on demokraatlikes riikides 
süstemaatiliselt ja ülekaalukalt valimisi võitnud erakonnad, kelle jätkuvad võidud 
politolooge sageli hämmastavad.  
Kuna predominantsust on võrdlemisi vähe uuritud, võeti kasutusele Giovanni Sartori 
klassifikatsioon ning sealt edasi David White’i teooria dominantsetest (sh 
autoritaarsetest) erakondadest ja nende paindlikkusest enda valijate huvide järele 
kohandumisel. White’i teooria võimaldas püstitada hüpoteesi, et predominantne erakond 
on enda hegemoonia säilitamiseks sunnitud valima kõiki valijaid püüdva catch-all 
strateegia, mis tähendab, et erakond liigub ideoloogilises mõttes tsentrisse ning lubab 
välja lubadusi, millest hoolivad suured ja olulised valijagrupid. 
Selleks, et seda hüpoteesi tõestada, analüüsiti Manifesto Research Groupi sisuanalüüsi 
meetodiga Aafrika Rahvusliku Kongressi 1994-1999 a valimiste programmme ning 
saadud tulemused paigutati MRG vasak-parempoolsele skaalale. Kombineerides 
erinevaid skaalasid, loodi skaala, millele saab asetada MRG meetodiga saadud 
tulemused ideoloogia välja selgitamiseks. Kuna antud töö keskendus tsentrismile, 
määrati kindlaks tsentrismi vahemik, mis on MRG skaalal -24 ja +30 vahel. 
Konservatiivsemad autorid asetavad tsentrismi -20 ja +20 vahele.  
Empiirilise analüüsi tulemusena kinnitati hüpoteesi, et Aafrika Rahvuslik Kongress kui 
predominantne erakond liikus alates 1994. aastast ideoloogisse tsentrisse, liikudes 
erandina alles 2009. aastal tsentrist eemale ja vasakule. Kasutades Afrobaromeetri 
uuringuid, selgitati välja Lõuna-Aafrika valijate olulisemad teemad ning analüüsi 
tulemusena selgus, et Aafrika Rahvuslik Kongress käitub ka sisulises mõttes catch-all 
strateegia alusel, keskendudes just nendele teemadele, mis suurele hulgale valijatele 
olulised on, nagu heaoluriigi laiendamine, töökohtade loomine, ühiskondlik võrdsus ja 
turvalisus.  
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Appendixes 
Appendix 1: the MRP coding scheme 
Domain 1: External Relations 
101 Foreign Special Relationships: Positive 
102 Foreign Special Relationships: Negative 
103 Anti-Imperialism: Positive 
104 Military: Positive 
105 Military: Negative 
106 Peace: Positive 
107 Internationalism: Positive 
108 European Integration: Positive 
109 Internationalism: Negative 
110 European Integration: Negative 
Domain 2: Freedom and Democracy 
201 Freedom and Human Rights: Positive 
202 Democracy: Positive 
203 Constitutionalism: Positive 
204 Constitutionalism: Negative 
Domain 3: Political System 
301 Decentralisation: Positive 
302 Centralisation: Positive 
303 Governmental and Administrative Efficiency: 
Positive 
304 Political Corruption: Negative 
305 Political Authority: Positive 
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Domain 4: Economy 
401 Free Enterprise: Positive 
402 Incentives: Positive 
403 Market Regulation: Positive 
404 Economic Planning: Positive 
405 Corporatism: Positive 
406 Protectionism: Positive 
407 Protectionism: Negative 
408 Economic Goals 
409 Keynesian Demand Management: Positive 
410 Economic Growth 
411 Technology and Infrastructure: Positive 
412 Controlled Economy: Positive 
413 Nationalisation: Positive 
414 Economic Orthodoxy: Positive 
415 Marxist Analysis: Positive 
416 Anti-Growth Economy: Positive 
Domain 5: Welfare and Quality of Life 
501 Environmental Protection: Positive 
502 Culture: Positive 
503 Equality: Positive 
504 Welfare State Expansion 
505 Welfare State Limitation 
506 Education Expansion 
507 Education Limitation 
Domain 6: Fabric of Society 
601 National Way of Life: Positive 
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602 National Way of Life: Negative 
603 Traditional Morality: Positive 
604 Traditional Morality: Negative 
605 Law and Order: Positive 
606 Civic Mindedness: Positive 
607 Multiculturalism: Positive 
608 Multiculturalism: Negative 
Domain 7: Social Groups 
701 Labour Groups: Positive 
702 Labour Groups: Negative 
703 Agriculture: Positive 
704 Middle Class and Professional Groups: Positive 
705 Minority Groups: Positive 
706 Non-Economic Demographic Groups: Positive 
(Budge 2001) 
Appendix 2: full results of the application of the MRP coding scheme on ANC’s manifestos 
All codification was done electronically, files can be obtained from the author for other use.  
Name of Category 
L-R 
scale Code 1994 1994 % 1999 
1999 
% 2004 
2004 
% 2009 
2009 
% 
No meaningful category applies   999 10 4.24 113 47.68 84 35.00 70 20.17 
Domain 1: External Relations                     
101 Foreign Special Relationships: Positive   101 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 0.29 
102 Foreign Special Relationships: Negative   102 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
103 Anti-Imperialism: Positive L 103 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
104 Military: Positive R 104 6 2.54 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
105 Military: Negative L 105 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
106 Peace: Positive L 106 3 1.27 0 0.00 3 1.25 4 1.15 
107 Internationalism: Positive L 107 5 2.12 5 2.11 11 4.58 6 1.73 
108 SADC integration: Positive   108 3 1.27 0 0.00 1 0.42 3 0.86 
109 Internationalism: Negative   109 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
110 SADC integration: Negative   110 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Domain 2: Freedom and Democracy               0.00   0.00 
201 Freedom and Human Rights: Positive R 201 7 2.97 2 0.84 4 1.67 3 0.86 
202 Democracy: Positive L 202 25 10.59 6 2.53 10 4.17 17 4.90 
203 Constitutionalism: Positive R 203 5 2.12 3 1.27 1 0.42 1 0.29 
204 Constitutionalism: Negative   204 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Domain 3: Political System           0.00   0.00   0.00 
301 Decentralisation: Positive   301 1 0.42 2 0.84 0 0.00 0 0.00 
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302 Centralisation: Positive   302 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
303 Governmental and Administrative Efficiency: 
Positive 
R 
303 4 1.69 7 2.95 5 2.08 8 2.31 
304 Political Corruption: Negative   304 2 0.85 2 0.84 4 1.67 1 0.29 
305 Political Authority: Positive   305 13 5.51 13 5.49 3 1.25 11 3.17 
Domain 4: Economy               0.00   0.00 
401 Free Enterprise: Positive R 401 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
402 Incentives: Positive R 402 3 1.27 1 0.42 6 2.50 2 0.58 
403 Market Regulation: Positive L 403 2 0.85 0 0.00 1 0.42 2 0.58 
404 Economic Planning: Positive L 404 2 0.85 0 0.00 1 0.42 1 0.29 
405 Corporatism: Positive   405 0 0.00 4 1.69 3 1.25 4 1.15 
406 Protectionism: Positive L 406 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 0.29 
407 Protectionism: Negative R 407 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 0.42 0 0.00 
408 Economic Goals   408 2 0.85 0 0.00 8 3.33 4 1.15 
409 Keynesian Demand Management: Positive   409 4 1.69 0 0.00 6 2.50 4 1.15 
410 Economic Growth   410 4 1.69 1 0.42 4 1.67 19 5.48 
411 Technology and Infrastructure: Positive   411 0 0.00 0 0.00 4 1.67 2 0.58 
412 Controlled Economy: Positive L 412 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
413 Nationalisation: Positive L 413 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
414 Economic Orthodoxy: Positive R 414 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 0.42 0 0.00 
415 Marxist Analysis: Positive   415 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
416 Anti-Growth Economy: Positive   416 4 1.69 1 0.42 0 0.00 5 1.44 
Domain 5: Welfare and Quality of Life               0.00   0.00 
501 Environmental Protection: Positive   501 1 0.42 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
502 Culture: Positive   502 0 0.00 1 0.42 0 0.00 5 1.44 
503 Equality: Positive   503 19 8.05 15 6.33 16 6.67 21 6.05 
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504 Welfare State Expansion L 504 36 15.25 8 3.38 18 7.50 53 15.27 
505 Welfare State Limitation R 505 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
506 Education Expansion L 506 17 7.20 1 0.42 2 0.83 25 7.20 
507 Education Limitation   507 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
508 Quality of Life   508 1 0.42 6 2.53 2 0.83 2 0.58 
Domain 6: Fabric of Society               0.00   0.00 
601 National Way of Life: Positive R 601 1 0.42 3 1.27 0 0.00 0 0.00 
602 National Way of Life: Negative   602 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
603 Traditional Morality: Positive R 603 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
604 Traditional Morality: Negative   604 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
605 Law and Order: Positive R 605 5 2.12 4 1.69 11 4.58 12 3.46 
606 Civic Mindedness: Positive R 606 22 9.32 22 9.28 9 3.75 2 0.58 
607 Multiculturalism: Positive   607 6 2.54 1 0.42 0 0.00 1 0.29 
608 Multiculturalism: Negative   608 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Domain 7: Social Groups               0.00   0.00 
701 Labour Groups: Positive L 701 9 3.81 10 4.22 12 5.00 29 8.36 
702 Labour Groups: Negative   702 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
703 Agriculture: Positive   703 5 2.12 1 0.42 1 0.42 6 1.73 
704 Middle Class and Professional Groups: 
Positive 
  
704 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
705 Minority Groups: Positive   705 3 1.27 0 0.00 1 0.42 2 0.58 
706 Non-Economic Demographic Groups: 
Positive 
  
706 2 0.85 4 1.69 2 0.83 6 1.73 
707 Rural Life and Development: Positive   707 4 1.69 1 0.42 5 2.08 14 4.03 
                      
N     236 236.00 237 237.00 240 240.00 347 347.00 
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Number of Left values:     99.00   30.00   58.00   138.00   
% L     -41.95 41.95 
-
12.66 12.66 
-
24.17 24.17 -39.77 39.77 
Number of right values:     53.00   42.00   38.00   28.00   
% R     22.46 22.46 17.72 17.72 15.83 15.83 8.07 8.07 
% ideological position     -19.49   5.06   -8.33   -31.70   
Programmatic content     152   72   96   166   
Non-programmatic content     84   165   144   181   
% of programmatic content     64   30   40   48   
 
